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In The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, Michel Rosenfeld re-
flects on the potential for forms of robust constitutionalism to develop
beyond the nation-state.' International regimes, he insists, are qualita-
tively different from states in this regard. The former engage in func-
tionally specific "governance," rather than in sovereignty-based "gov-
ernment."2 As important, relative to long-established nation-states, the
agents of transnational constitutionalism typically confront more mate-
rial, ideological, and religious diversity than do those who would seek to
construct or transform national constitutional identities. In the interna-
tional realm, because "there seems to be nothing akin to the bonds of
the national identity," the "possibility of a transnational constitutional
identity ... remains very much in question."3 Nonetheless, Rosenfeld
argues, something akin to constitutionalism at the transnational level
has appeared in Europe-at least in the rights domain. The outcome
partly depends on the fortunes of "rights patriotism," an ideological
movement whose force has expanded as the norms and practices of ad-
judicating fundamental rights have converged since the 1950s in Europe
and elsewhere.4
Here I will argue that the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR, or, the Convention) is, in fact, quickly evolving into a transna-
tional constitutional regime.5 The evidence in support of this claim is
partly provided by how the regime operates after its transformation
through Protocol No. 11. With Protocol No. 11, which entered into
force on November 1, 1998, all of the High Contracting Parties accepted
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the unfettered right of individuals to petition the European Court. Evi-
dence is also provided by the impact of the incorporation of the ECHR
into national legal orders (Part II).6 Today, in Rosenfeld's terms, the
ECHR and national constitutional rights are increasingly "integrated":
they complement and overlap one another.7 In my view, the regime's
judicial organ-the European Court of Human Rights, or, the Court-
not only functions as a "constitutional court," it is today the single most
important rights-protecting court in the world.
I. A CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME
Protocol No. 11 confers upon the Court compulsory jurisdiction
over applications by individuals who claim a violation of Convention
rights, once their national remedies have been exhausted. If the Court
finds a violation, it may award monetary damages. Unlike a national
constitutional court, however, the Court has no authority to invalidate a
national norm that conflicts with the Convention. Put differently, the
Court does not exercise direct authority within national legal orders. In
the 1970s, when states could still opt out of compulsory jurisdiction, the
regime received only 163 individual petitions, rising to 455 in the 1980s.
Under Protocol No. 11, the number of petitions exploded. In 1999, the
Registry of the Court received 8400 complaints, a figure that has in-
creased every year since, to 61,300 applications in 2010. Although some
ninety-six percent of all petitions will be ruled inadmissible for one rea-
son or another, the Court is overloaded. The annual rate of judgments
on the merits shows the same trend. Through 1982, the Court had is-
sued, in its history, only sixty-one full rulings pursuant to applications
by individuals. In 1999, it rendered 250 fully reasoned judgments on the
merits, 1200 in 2005, and 2607 in 2010.8 Under Protocol No. 11, the
European Court is the most active rights-protecting court in the world.
A. Governance Functions
As Rosenfeld notes, all constitutional regimes, whether transna-
tional or national, "share ... [a] commitment to the three essential
components of [contemporary] constitutionalism: limitation of powers;
6 See A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
(Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
7 ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 255.
8 Annual statistics are reported on the Court's website. See Statistical Information, EUR.
CT. HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Reports+and+Statistics/Statistics/
Statistical+data (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
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adherence to the rule of law; and protection of fundamental rights."9 A
robust system of protecting fundamental rights tends to subsume how
the other two components are defined. The ECHR regime is truly pan-
European, covering forty-seven states with a population exceeding 800
million people. Its raison d'6tre is to reinforce national constitutional-
ism, as just defined. More specifically, the Court performs three govern-
ance functions: it renders justice to individual applicants, beyond the
state (a justice function); it supervises the respect for fundamental rights
on the part of state officials, including judges (a monitoring function);
and it determines the scope and content of Convention rights, in light of
state practice (an oracular, or lawmaking, function). The Court regards
the ECHR as a type of transnational constitution, 0 but it does not exer-
cise sovereignty within national orders. The Court's case law gains in-
fluence domestically only through the complicity of national officials.
Why did the states negotiate and ratify Protocol No. 11, knowing
that the reform would radically enhance the authority of the Court to
perform its functions? I would emphasize two major factors. First, after
World War II, Western Europe became the epicenter of a "new consti-
tutionalism," which, with successive waves of democratization, spread
across the continent. This development broadly corresponds to the
emergence of Rosenfeld's concept of "rights patriotism," a movement
that places rights at the very core of constitutionalism. The older na-
tional "constitutional models" that Rosenfeld so well describes in chap-
ters 5 and 6 of his book are effectively altered to accommodate a privi-
leged place for rights protection. Legislative sovereignty, in its
traditional guise, is steadily overthrown, and constitutional judicial re-
view of the type institutionalized in Germany and Spain becomes the
taken-for-granted, best-practice standard. The Court richly benefits
from these changes, allowing it to operate in a relatively permissive en-
vironment.
Second, the Soviet bloc collapsed. In the 1990s, with constitutional
reconstruction in full swing, the European Union (EU) and the Council
of Europe offered admission to post-communist states on the basis of
certain conditions, including a commitment to rights protection. Lock-
ing them into the ECHR and placing them under the supervision of its
Court was an obvious means of securing that commitment. In fact, the
ECHR has played a crucial role in democratic transitions in post-
communist Europe.11 States modeled their new bills of rights on the
9 ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 269.
10 The Court has itself called the ECHR "a constitutional instrument" of European public
law. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1995).
11 See THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (Leonard Hammer & Frank Emmert eds., 2011); TRANSITION-




ECHR, with an eye toward future membership in the EU and the Coun-
cil of Europe; many even signed the ECHR prior to ratifying new consti-
tutions (including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Poland, Slo-
vakia, and Ukraine). For the core states of Western Europe, folding the
post-communist states into the ECHR also fulfilled strategic interests.
Protocol No. 11 made the regime an extraordinarily efficient mecha-
nism for monitoring the internal politics of states that still posed serious
threats to the stability of Europe as a whole. For western states, the cost
of Protocol No. 11 is enhanced supervision of their own rights-
regarding activities, a tax they have thus far been willing to pay. In to-
day's system there is virtually no state norm or decision that is immune
from judicial review.
B. Adjudicating Rights
The European Court has steadily raised standards of rights protec-
tion under the Convention (the oracular, lawmaking function). This
process has routinely placed states, including powerful ones, in non-
compliance with the Convention, all but requiring them to upgrade
national rights protection.12 This fact is in tension with the view that a
system of enforcing international human rights can lead only to "rights
minimalism": given the great diversity of national traditions, lowest-
common-denominator outcomes are "the best we can hope for."3
Rosenfeld also takes a minimalist position, 14 most notably in his discus-
sion of the European Court's "margin of appreciation" jurisprudence.
The Court uses the margin of appreciation doctrine, he suggests, to jus-
tify giving deference to states when they abridge an individual's rights,
not least to preserve values that are essential to their national identity.15
Most Convention rights are, in fact, "qualified" by an express limitation
clause: rights can be infringed by states when "necessary" to achieve
some designated public interest. Rosenfeld characterizes the margin of
appreciation as an effective "judicial instrument. . . designed to strike
the requisite equilibrium between convergence and divergence in the
application of the ECHR."16 I partly disagree with this portrayal.
The master instrument used by the Court to harmonize standards
of rights protection across national systems is proportionality analysis
12 A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6 (documenting eighteen different states).
13 Joshua Cohen, Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?, 12 J. POL.
PHIL. 190, 213 (2004); see also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS As POLITICS AND IDOLA-
TRY (2001); MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD
(1994).
14 ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 269-70.
15 Id. at 256-58.
16 Id. at 256.
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(PA), which was developed after the early margin of appreciation case
law examined by Rosenfeld. PA is tailor-made for the adjudication of
qualified rights, and it is the crucial mechanism of coordination in the
ECHR regime.17 The Court uses PA to adjudicate virtually all Conven-
tion rights, and it insists that all national courts use it as well.18 In the
standard sequence, once a judge determines that a right is in play, she
then verifies that the measure under review: (a) was lawful under na-
tional law; (b) was properly designed to achieve a stated purpose (means
are rationally related to ends); and (c) does not infringe more on the
right than is necessary to achieve objectives (a test for least-restrictive
alternatives). The European Court often uses this last stage to balance,
insofar as the Court weighs the cost to the right-claimant against the
public benefits of the measure, in light of the facts. Thus, how any quali-
fied right is actually enforced will always be contingent upon local con-
ditions, and the state that has infringed upon a right always bears the
burden of justifying the necessity of the chosen means.
The Court uses PA, in part, to determine how much discretion-
the size of the "margin of appreciation"-states possess in any domain
governed by the ECHR. In practice, the Court infuses the analysis with a
simple comparative method for determining when "new" rights have
emerged in the system, or when the scope of existing rights merits ex-
pansion. The Court will typically raise the standard of protection in a
given domain when a sufficient number of states have withdrawn pub-
lic-interest justifications for restricting the right. The margin of appreci-
ation thus shrinks as consensus on higher standards of rights protection
emerges within the regime, shifting the balance in favor of future appli-
cants. The move puts laggard states out of compliance. Nonetheless, the
Court can claim that there is an external, "objective" means of deter-
mining the weights to be given to the values in conflict, and the Court's
supporters can usually assert that the Court's bias is majoritarian, trans-
national, and prorights. A state that would choose not to comply is left
to defend a lower standard of rights protection, on idiosyncratic or na-
tionalistic grounds, which would be counter to a wider "rights patriot-
ism.
While I would stress that (as a formal, doctrinal matter) the margin
of appreciation is now the product of PA, Rosenfeld could rightly point
to a number of high-profile cases in which the Court appears to deploy
its deference doctrine to avoid taking politically controversial deci-
17 See Mattias Kumm, Constitutional Rights As Principles: On the Structure and Domain of
Constitutional Justice, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 574 (2004); Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Propor-
tionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 151 (2008).
18 See Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 45 (1999).
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sions.19 The fact that the margin of appreciation doctrine is, at times,
deployed strategically in this way may, in fact, help to explain the
Court's extraordinary success in raising standards of rights protection
more generally.
II. THE ECHR AND NATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS
In 1955, when the Convention entered into force, Ireland was the
only Contracting Party to the ECHR with any meaningful experience
with the judicial protection of fundamental rights. The constitutions of
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United King-
dom either did not contain such rights, or they denied the judiciary the
authority to review the legality of statutes. The German and the Italian
constitutional courts, newly born, were not yet operating. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that a majority of signatory states rejected pro-
posals to give individuals an automatic right of petition, and to make the
jurisdiction of the European Court compulsory. Today, legislative sov-
ereignty in Europe has been virtually extinguished, and rights review-
either under the constitution, the ECHR, or both-is the norm.
A. Incorporation
Over the last two decades, in a process that accelerated after the en-
try into force of Protocol No. 11, all state parties to the ECHR incorpo-
rated the ECHR into domestic legal orders.20 Domestification proceeded
via different routes: express constitutional provision (some post-
communist states); judicial interpretation of constitutional provisions
not mentioning the ECHR (most states in Western Europe); or special
statutes (United Kingdom, Ireland, and Scandinavia). With incorpora-
tion, all national courts in the system are capable of enforcing the Con-
vention: individuals can plead the ECHR at national bar; judges are un-
der a duty to identify statutes that conflict with Convention rights; and
high courts may refuse to apply statutes that conflict with Convention
19 E.g., Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06 (2011), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/resources/hudoc/
lautsi and others v italy.pdf (denying a claim that crucifixes hung in Italian public schools
violate freedom of religion); A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 (2010), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.
int/tkpl97view.asp?action=html&documentld=878721&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydoc
number&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01CI166DEA398649 (permitting the prohibition on
abortions on grounds of health and well-being).
20 The most complete scholarly treatments of incorporation are A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, supra
note 6, and THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 11.
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rights, with the notable exception of those in the United Kingdom and
Ireland.
Incorporation is an inherently constitutional process. The Conven-
tion has developed into a "surrogate" constitution in every state that did
not possess its own judicially enforceable charter of rights (including
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United King-
dom). Finland, Norway, and Sweden enacted new bills of rights, closely
modeled on (and invoking) the ECHR, in order to fill gaps in their own
constitutions. In those states that possess, at least on paper, relatively
complete systems of constitutional justice, incorporation provides sup-
plementary protection. We find this situation in Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and in the post-communist states.
To take an important example, the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal
enforces the ECHR as a set of quasi-constitutional norms. 21 The Tribu-
nal will strike down statutes that violate the Convention as per se un-
constitutional; it interprets Spanish constitutional rights in light of the
ECHR, wherever possible; and it has ordered the ordinary courts to
abide by the Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence as a matter of constitu-
tional obligation, including case law generated by litigation not involv-
ing Spain. If the judiciary ignores the Court's jurisprudence, individuals
can appeal directly to the Tribunal for redress. The German Federal
Constitutional Court has recently taken a step in this direction.22 In
many post-communist states, as well, constitutional judges invoke the
Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence as authority, in order to enhance the
status of fundamental rights-and hence their own positions-in the
national constitutional order.
Most states have conferred onto the ECHR supralegislative but
infraconstitutional rank. Strikingly, some states have given the Conven-
tion constitutional rank (e.g., Albania, Austria, and Slovenia) and, in the
Netherlands, the ECHR enjoys supraconstitutional status. In Belgium,
the Constitutional Court has determined that the ECHR possesses
supralegislative but infraconstitutional rank, whereas the Supreme
Court has held that the ECHR possesses supraconstitutional status,
thereby enhancing its autonomy vis-A-vis the Constitutional Court. The
Belgian example is an outcome of a structural condition produced by
incorporation, which I call "rights pluralism."
21 Mercedes Candela Soriano, The Reception Process in Spain and Italy, in A EUROPE OF
RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 393.
22 Frank Hoffrneister, Germany: Status of European Convention on Human Rights in Do-
mestic Law, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 722 (2006).
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B. Rights Pluralism
Rosenfeld rightly contrasts the traditional model of the national
constitutional system, which is relatively "cohesive, unified, [and] hier-
archically ordered" in order to maximize "formal convergence among
all diverse elements and interests," with the transnational one, wherein
"there is no comparable hierarchy or unity."23 In practice, one assumes
that a constitutional court (under rights-based constitutionalism) or a
parliament (under a regime of legislative sovereignty) possesses the "fi-
nal word" on questions involving the validity of, or conflict among, legal
norms within the system.
The potential for national constitutional hierarchy and unity to be
undermined is nonetheless great in all states that incorporated the
ECHR in ways that made Convention rights-and the Court's prece-
dents-directly enforceable by national judges against conflicting stat-
utes. In such cases, incorporation destroyed the prohibition of judicial
review, while establishing "rights pluralism." Rights pluralism refers to
any situation in which two or more sources of judicially enforceable
rights coexist. In such situations, litigants have a choice of which right to
plead, and judges can choose which right to enforce.
Rights pluralism has fundamentally reconfigured national constitu-
tional law, both substantively and with respect to how courts interact
with legislators, administrators, and one another.24 Many judges will
now refuse to apply law that conflicts with the Convention; at the same
time, they are abandoning the methods of statutory interpretation tradi-
tionally derived from legislative sovereignty. Instead of seeking to dis-
cern legislative intent, judges increasingly favor the purposive construc-
tion of statutes in light of fundamental rights jurisprudence. In systems
in which multiple, functionally differentiated high courts coexist (the
majority of states), pluralism means that the supreme courts of ordinary
jurisdiction are likely to evolve into de facto constitutional courts when-
ever they review the conventionality of statutes. To the extent that they
do so, the monopoly of the constitutional court to determine the condi-
tions under which judges may refuse to apply statutes will have been
destroyed.
To illustrate, France was once dogmatically attached to the prohibi-
tion of judicial review of statutes; today rights pluralism means that it
23 ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 248.
24 Mads Andenas & Eirik Bjorge, National Implementation of ECHR Rights: Kant's Cate-
gorical Imperative and the Convention (Univ. of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, No. 2011-15, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1818845.
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has three rights-protecting high courts. Indeed, from the point of view
of the rights-claimant, the Supreme Civil Court (Cour d'cassation) and
the Council of State (the supreme administrative court) function as the
"real" constitutional courts, and litigants and judges treat the Conven-
tion as the "real" charter of rights. Individuals, after all, have no direct
access to the Constitutional Council; and it is the ECHR, not the Consti-
tutional Council, that supervises the rights-protecting activities of the
civil and administrative courts. Thus, three autonomous high courts
now protect fundamental rights. Convergence cannot be presumed
since there is no formal, hierarchy-based means of coordinating rights
doctrine, or of resolving conflicts, among these courts. A similar story
can be told with respect to Italy. 25
More generally, rights pluralism changes the incentives facing
judges on high courts. Simplifying a complex topic, there are several
basic logics at work. The first is an "avoidance of punishment" rationale:
enforcing Convention rights will make the state-in practice, the court
of last resort-less vulnerable to censure in Strasbourg. This logic is
especially pronounced in national systems that otherwise prohibit the
judicial review of statute or do not have a national charter of rights. A
second dynamic is embedded in domestic politics. Individuals and
NGOs may seek to leverage the ECHR to alter law and policy, and judg-
es may work to entrench Convention rights in order to enhance their
own authority with respect to other national organs, including courts.
Third, as the CLO gains in effectiveness, the interest high courts have in
seeking to influence the evolution of the ECHR increases. Even for a
court that is relatively jealous of its own autonomy, constructive en-
gagement is more likely to constrain the Court than the more costly
alternatives: defection and open conflict. Each of these dynamics will
tend to: (1) enhance the status of the Convention in national legal or-
ders, thereby reinforcing rights pluralism; (2) aid the system as a whole
in transcending rights minimalism; and (3) favor the further construc-
tion of the beliefs and practices that Rosenfeld associates with the ideol-
ogy of "rights patriotism."
CONCLUSION
In Europe, a rights-based, transnational constitutionalism has been
consolidated as the ECHR and national systems of constitutional justice
have become increasingly embedded. Pan-European constitutionalism
25 Alec Stone Sweet, Le Conseil Constitutionnel et la Transformation de la Ripublique [The
Constitutional Council and the Transformation of the Republic], 25 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL
CONSTITUTIONNEL 65 (2008) (Fr.).
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is partly a product of formal, doctrinal features (of incorporation, for
example). It is due, in part, to the consequences of rights pluralism on
the rights-regarding decisions of judges and other national officials.
With very few exceptions, every judge in Europe is now positioned to
enforce Convention rights in the domestic order. These claims are em-
pirical. I have not argued a normative position. Europe may or may not
be better off by enhancing the authority of judges to enforce fundamen-
tal rights. Further, the overall system only imperfectly protects rights;
the European Court, after all, is activated by the inadequacies of national
protection. Nonetheless, if current trends continue, a set of profound
normative issues will be impossible to avoid. As Rosenfeld emphasizes,
the traditional model of constitutional unity and sovereignty has pro-
vided basic materials for defending rights constitutionalism at the na-
tional level. In my view, this model is rapidly disintegrating, while there
is no clear replacement in sight. As a result, the political legitimacy (and
viability) of the emergent, multilevel system of protecting rights in Eu-
rope-one dominated by judges and interjudicial dialogue, rather than
by elected officials-remains, as Rosenfeld has suggested, "very much in
question."26
26 ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 248.
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